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Abstract
The purpose of the study is to analyze the influence of board size and audit quality
on company value listed on the LQ 45 index of the Indonesian Stock Exchange for
the 2012–2014 period. The variables that were tested in this study consist of board
size and audit quality, which were measured using indicators of auditor competence
and auditor independence, and by using leverage and company value as the control
variables. This study used a data panel regression technique and a random effect
method (REM) for processing the data. This method was chosen because the Hausman
test probability value is more than 5 percent (not significant). The results of the study
were: (1) board size positively influences company value, and (2) audit quality
positively influences company value when measured using auditor competence, and
negatively influences company value when measured using auditor independence.
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1. Introduction
Brigham and Houston (2010) state that the main purpose of financial management is
to maximize the stockholder assets in the long term. To become more reliable for the
investors to encourage them to invest their money in the company, good-quality audit
services need to be used, such as auditors from the Big Four Public Accountant Firms
(Kantor Akuntan Publik (KAPs)). According to Christiawan (2003), the quality of audit
services is determined based on two things, which are independence and competence.
Independence is an ethic that must be kept by the auditor, who is required to be honest
and objective in auditing. There is no independence if an auditor has a relationship
(family or financial) with the client [15]. Auditor independence is shown through audit
opinion, which is one of the information sources that is useful in making decisions for
investing and budgeting (Guillamon, 2003).
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Auditor competence can be determined using the size of KAP [13]. Based on sig-
naling theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981), a company will be motivated to give
information regarding the achievements and failures of the company. Audit quality
can be a piece of information that gives positive and negative signals. Nonetheless,
the research results of Rosner (2003) and Juliardi (2013) show that audit quality does
not have a significant influence on company value for both those audited by the Big
Four KAPs as well as non-Big Four firms. The research conducted by Juliardi (2013) uses
the stock market price to measure company value. Another phenomenon identified by
Afiah (2015) reveals that the quality of many local KAPs do not meet the international
competence standards; this is because the accountancy-service market is dominated
by the Big Four, so the majority of local KAPs are not capable of providing programs to
increase their accountancy quality. For this reason, it needs to be tested whether the
audit quality influences the company value.
Isshaq et al. (2009) and Sari and Usman (2014) explain that board size has a signifi-
cant positive influence on company value. Furthermore, Wulandari (2006) and Sari and
Ardiana (2014) show that the positive relationship is not significant. On the other hand,
Gill and Mathur (2011) observe that board size has a negative influence on company
value.
Based on the aforementioned information, the purposes of this study are (1) to ana-
lyze the influence of audit quality on company value and (2) to analyze the influence
of board size on company value.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Audit quality
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the assessment by the market with respect
to the possibility that the auditor will present (a) a finding regarding a violation in the
client’s accountancy system and (b) a violation in the entry. Christiawan (2002) shows
that the audit quality can be determined using two things, which are independence and
competence. To produce a good-quality audit, an auditor is required to have adequate
competence and good independence. Auditor competence is identified by the size of
the KAN, which in this case is the Big Four.
Based on signaling theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981), a company will be moti-
vated to give information regarding the achievements and failures of the company.
Audit quality can be a piece of information that gives positive and negative signals.
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Nonetheless, the research results of Rosner (2003) and Juliardi (2013) show that audit
quality does not have a significant influence on company value for both those audited
by the Big Four KAPs as well as non-Big Four firms. The research conducted by Juliardi
(2013) uses the stock market price to measure company value. Another phenomenon
identified by Afiah (2015) reveals that the quality ofmany local KAPs does notmeet the
international competence standards; this is because the accountancy-service market
is dominated by the Big Four, so the majority of local KAPs are not capable of providing
a program to increase their accountancy quality. Based on this reason, it needs to be
tested whether audit quality influences the company value.
2.2. Board size
Board size is the total number of people on the board of directors and board of com-
missioners in the company. The board of commissioners is the part of the company
that has a duty to provide general supervision and/or specific supervision based on
the articles of association and give advice to the board of directors. The board of
directors is the part of the company that has the authority and full responsibility for
the management of the company based on the aims and purposes of the company,
and acts as the company representative, both inside and outside the courts according
to the rules of the article of association [22].
In general, the boards of the company will make decisions on company policy/
strategy and make sure that the company has fulfilled all the rules detailed in the
article of association and the valid laws. Agency theory states that a bigger board size
will make the management supervision more effective, have the potential to provide
wider experience and knowledge, give better advice for company advancement and
produce higher company performance ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
2.3. Leverage
The composition of the company’s capital structure (i.e., the composition of debt and
equity) could affect the company value. Discussions around this topic began with a
study by Modigliani and Miller (1958), and, since that time, various models related to
capital structure have appeared. According to Booth et al. (2001), there are three kinds
of main theoretical model explaining capital structure/sources of financing, such as (1)
the static trade-off model (STO), (2) the pecking order hypothesis (POH) and (3) the
agency theory framework (ATF). In each model, the option between debt and equity
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depends on specific factors for the company as well as its institutional factors. Booth
et al. (2001) observe that those factors are the consequences of tax, agency costs,
financial distress, funding hierarchy and the POH.
2.4. Company size
Companies are categorized into two sizes: small-scale and big-scale companies. The
research conducted by Gill and Obradovich (2012) states that company size has a
positive effect and is significant to the company value. The result of that research
supports the research conducted by Yunita (2011), which explains that big companies
have more resources to increase company value because they have better access to
external information than small companies.
2.5. Company value
The purpose of establishing a company is to increase company value or to grow the
company. The growth of a company that can easily be seen is the end result of an
external assessment of company assets as well as growth in the stock market. Com-
pany value is the price that would be paid if the company were going to be sold.
Company value can be reflected through stock price. The higher the stock price, the
higher the rate of return to the investor, which means that the company value gets
higher as it is in accordance with the objectives of the company, which is to maximize
the prosperity of the shareholders.
This study investigates company value using the Tobin’s Q ratio. The Tobin’s Q ratio
was chosen because it is more rational to measure company value using the Tobin’s
Q ratio considering that the elements of obligation need to be counted as the basis of
the calculation. One of the modified and simplified versions of Tobin’s Q, by Smithers
and Wright (2007), is as follows:
𝑄 = (𝐸𝑀𝑉 + 𝐷)/(𝐸𝐵𝑉 + 𝐷),
where:
EMV = Equity market value
EBV = Equity book value
D = Debt
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2.6. Framework and hypotheses
The quality of the audit being measured with respect to the auditor’s independence
shows that the higher the independence level of the auditor, the more enhanced the
credibility of the financial report. It is expected that this, along with the enhanced
credibility of the financial report, will affect the company stock price, and increase
the company value. Ardiana (2014) conducted a research project that proves that the
independence of an auditor has a significant positive effect; it states that the higher
the auditor’s independence, the more it will enhance the credibility of the financial
report, and it is expected to increase the company value. A different result is given
by Dewata et al. (2015), who believe that an auditor’s independence does not have
significant effect on the company value.
Agency theory claims that a bigger board size will help to make management con-
trol more effective, has the potential to provide broader experience and knowledge,
gives better suggestions toward company progress and results in higher company
performance. The theory is supported by research conducted by Issha et al. (2009)
and Sari and Usman (2004), who maintain that board size has a significant positive
effect on company value. However, research conducted by Wulandari (2006) and Sari
and Ardiana (2014) concludes that board size might have a positive relationship, but it
does not significantly affect the company value. These research projects are supported
by Dewata et al. (2015), who state that board size has a positive effect on the company
value. However, a research project conducted by Gill and Marthur (2011) produced
a different result, which is that board size has a significant negative effect on the
company value.
The hypotheses tested in this research are:
H1: Board size has a positive effect on company value.
H2𝑎: The competence of the auditor has a positive effect on company value.
H2𝑏: The independence of the auditor has a positive effect on company value.
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Sample and population
The population of this research is the annual financial reports of companies who are
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The data was taken from the Indonesian
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Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and the IDX website (n.d.). The companies are those
listed in index LQ 45 from 2012–2014.
3.2. Operational variables
1. Board size, which is the combined total number of personnel in the board of
commissioners and board of directors of a company.
2. Audit competence quality, implemented using a dummy variable of 1 for a com-
pany that is audited by a Big Four KAP and 0 for a company that is audited by a
non-Big-Four KAP.
3. A proxy of independence with audit opinion for company I in year t, such as:
4. Unqualified opinion = score of 4
5. Modified unqualified opinion = score of 3
6. Qualified opinion = score of 2
7. Adverse opinion = score of 1
8. Disclaimer of opinion = score of 0
9. Company account, which is the Tobin’s Q ratio
10. Leverage debt/asset
4. Result and Discussion
4.1. Regression model analysis
The data panel regression technique can implement three alternative approaches
that are the common-constant method (i.e., the pooled ordinary least squares [OLS]
method), the fixed effect method (FEM) and the random effect method (REM). The
result of implementing the common-constant method shows that this model contains
an auto-correlation with the Durbin–Watson value of 0.2819, which is less than 2. In
conclusion, the common-constant method is too simple to describe the phenomenon.
Testing of this model can be explored further by using the Hausman test.
The Hausman test is done to compare the FEM and REM. The result of this test
will allow the researcher to choose the best research model from FEM and REM. The
probability value of a cross-section random test is 0.6807, which means there is no
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significance with a significance level 95 percent (α = 5%). Therefore, the decision for
the Hausman test is to accept (p-value > 0.05), which resulted in the following:
H0: REM
H1: FEM
Hence, the method chosen for this research was REM.
The result of the classic assumption test shows that the data is normal, there is no
multi-collinearity in the regression model, there is no heteroscedasticity and there is
no auto-correlation.
4.2. Significance test (T test and F test)
The result of the output from the Eviews 9 computer programwas the following double
regression equation:
𝑄 = 17.1336 + 0.0732𝐵𝑆 + 0.4980𝐾𝐴–0.1374𝐼𝐴 + 0.4386𝐹𝑆–0.4155𝐿𝐸𝑉 .
The result of the F test was a probability of 0.000022, which shows a significant
influence based on a significance (α) of less than 5 percent. It means that the loose and
controlled variables, which consist of board size, audit quality, leverage and company
size, affect the company account that is listed in LQ 45.
The result of the T test is a positive constant, which shows that if the board size,
audit quality, leverage and company size are in fixed conditions, the company account
increases by 17.1336. The regression coefficient for board size (BS) had a positive value
and every additional member of personnel (commissioners and directors) will increase
the company account by 0.0732. The regression coefficient for the leverage variable
had a negative value, which means that if the company increases stock through lever-
age (LEV), it could decrease the company account by 0.4155.
Audit quality (KA), which is measured using an auditor competence indicator, has a
positive regressive coefficient; this means that if a company uses a Big Four KAP, the
company account will increase by 0.4980. However, from the auditor independence
(IA) indicator used to measure negative audit quality, it means that every audit opinion
by an auditor could decrease the company account by 0.1374.
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4.3. Determination coefficient testing (R2)
Determination coefficient testing is used to measure the size of the impact of the
model’s ability to explain the variable. The determination coefficient produced by this
research was 31.68 percent, which means the variables investigated in this research
explain 31.68 percent of the impact and the rest (68.32%) is explained by variables
outside of the model.
4.4. Discussion
Board size has a positive influence on the value of the company. This means that
the greater the number of people on the board of commissioners and board of direc-
tors, the better the value of the company in the eyes of investors. This supports the
descriptive results that demonstrate the average company board size is 10.13; this
amount is considered to fulfill the rules of the Financial Services Authority (Otoritas
Jasa Keuangan (OJK)), which state that the number of board members (commissioners
and directors) should be a maximum of six persons to actualize good governance of
the company, and that could raise the company value. This result supports the agency
theory that explains that a bigger board size makes monitoring management more
effective. The implication of the results of this survey is that the bigger the board size
(which includes of directors, dependent commissioners and independent commission-
ers), the higher the company value; this led to the conclusion that adding one more
member to a board could increase the amount of monitoring and the effectiveness of
making decisions. When the decisions are considered to have a certain level of quality
and be efficient, it could attract investors and would increase the company value. The
results of this survey are supported by the studies of Isshaq et al. (2009), Dewata et al.
(2015) and John et al. (2015), whichmaintain that the board size has a positive influence
on the company value.
The variable of audit quality, which is proxied by the auditor’s competence and
auditor’s independence, shows a different influence on the company value at a dif-
ferent significance level. An auditor’s competence might have a positive influence on
the company value at a 5 percent significance level, while an auditor’s independence
might have a negative influence on the company value at a 10 percent significance
level. For the sample in this survey, the auditor’s competence has a positive influence
on the company value, which happens because the majority of the companies listed
on LQ 45 (92.59%) use the services of one of the Big Four KAPs to audit their financial
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reports. This can be interpreted to mean that, for investors, the results of an audit that
is completed by one of the Big Four KAPs is sufficiently trusted that it could increase
the company value. Investors of companies on LQ 45 believe that having one of the
Big Four KAPs produce their audit report would maintain their credibility, and that the
auditors of the Big Four KAPs would be more careful when completing an audit to
detect any fraud perpetrated by its clients. An audit report that has good credibility
will have an influence on the stock price of the company, so that could increase the
company value. This result supports Hussainey’s (2009) and Ardiana’s (2014) studies.
Another proxy of the audit quality is auditor independence, which has a negative
influence on the company value. This is because themarket responds negatively to the
stock price of the company where there is a common opinion on an audit without any
exceptions. In theory, a common opinion without exceptions is what is most expected
by the clients because such a common opinion could guarantee that the financial report
that was arranged by the management of the company does not contain any false
material and reaches the standards for an appropriate financial accountant. This survey
does not support Ardiana’s (2014) study, which finds that auditor independence has a
positive influence on the values of the company.
The result of the hypothesis test for leverage as a control variable shows that it has
no significant effect on the company value. This survey demonstrates that companies
that are listed on LQ 45 mostly use a source of finances from within the company
instead of borrowing finances, so that the approximate amount of debt that the com-
pany owes will not affect the approximate company value. This survey supports Putri
et al.’s (2015) survey. Another reason is that investors do not pay attention to the
approximate debts that the company owes because the investors are more interested
in how the management of the company utilizes the financial debt itself effectively
and efficiently to achieve more value for the company. This survey also supports the
survey of Mahendra Dj et al. (2012).
Firm size as a control variable under the influence of board size and audit quality on
the company value is found to have a positive significant influence on the company
values for the companies that are listed on LQ 45. This translates as the fact that a
bigger level of assets can allow the repayment of an investment, which will lessen the
level of uncertainty of the investors. The results of this survey support the findings
of Sofyaningsih and Hardiningsih (2011), Gill and Obradovich (2012) and Le and Phung
(2013), which reveal that the size of the company has a significant and positive influ-
ence on the company value because a big company is considered to have more assets
and be more stable as a result of the projection of a high stock price that keeps rising.
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5. Conclusion and Implications
5.1. Conclusion
The results of this survey are as follows:
1. Board size has a positive influence on the company value. This means that the
greater the number of members of the board of commissioners and board of
directors, the better the company value in the eyes of the investors.
2. The auditor competence proxy of the audit quality variable has a positive influ-
ence on the company value. This means that, for investors, the audit reports that
are produced by the Big Four KAPs are trusted, which could increase the company
value. Investors of companies on LQ 45 think that the Big Four KAPs would wish
to maintain their credibility in producing their audit reports, so auditors of the
Big Four KAPs will be careful in completing the audit process to detect any fraud
perpetrated by the clients.
3. The auditor independence proxy of the audit quality variable has a negative influ-
ence on the company value. This is because the market responds negatively to
the stock price of the company for which there is a common opinion on an audit
without exceptions.
5.2. Implications
The results of this survey are expected to provide suggestions to the investors who
are assessing a company for the purpose of making an investment. For investors, the
combined size of the boards of commissioners and directors is consideration for under-
taking an investment. This is because the bigger the size of the company’s board, the
better the company value. That means that a company is free from the management
practice of profit and has a good governance. In addition, the audit quality is also
a consideration when making a decision to invest in a company. If that company is
audited by one of the Big Four KAPs, it can be concluded that the financial information
that they present in a report is reliable.
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